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Copyright, creators and 
society’s need for autonomous 
art – the blessing and curse 
of monetary incentives
Martin Senftleben1
1. The field of literary and artistic production
Refining Niklas Luhmann’s concept of relatively closed social systems 
with a distinct identity and a boundary between them and their 
environment,2 Pierre Bourdieu developed the concept of ‘fields’ in 
society. Although constituting an autonomous social space with its 
own rules, dominance structures and established set of opinions, 
a  field  is not isolated from other social spaces and processes 
surrounding it. The structure of a field results from constant internal 
1  PhD; Professor of Intellectual Property and Director, Kooijmans Institute for Law and 
Governance, VU University Amsterdam; Of Counsel, Bird & Bird, The Hague. I would like to 
thank Jeremy de Beer, Graeme Dinwoodie, Dev Gangjee, Christophe Geiger, Rebecca Giblin, 
Caroline Ncube, Tony Reese, Kimberlee Weatherall, Alexander Peukert and the participants of 
the workshop ‘Social Science Approaches to Copyright’ at the University of Frankfurt for their 
valuable comments on a previous draft.
2  N Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, (Suhrkamp, 1984).
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fights of competing players for predominance and leadership.3 A field’s 
degree of autonomy, then, depends on the extent to which external 
players can influence these internal fights. External factors may have 
a deep impact on a field’s constitution.4 Given the continuous change 
of power relations, the structure of a social field is not static and fixed. 
By contrast, a field has its own history reflecting different stages 
of development – from the field’s genesis as a social space with far-
reaching autonomy to the potential loss of this autonomous position 
as a result of powerful external influences.5 For the analysis of a given 
field, it is thus necessary to examine its relationship with the social 
environment in which it is embedded at a given point in time.
Applying this theoretical model to the field of literary and artistic 
production, Bourdieu assumes that the field’s autonomy rests on the 
rejection of the capitalism of the bourgeoisie. The field of literature 
and art militates against the bourgeois logic of profit maximisation 
by developing its own, independent logic. This specific ‘nomos’ of 
the literary and artistic field lies in the independence from economic 
and political powers.6 Instead of striving for commercial success, an 
autonomous literary or artistic production aims at internal recognition 
within the field. It emancipates itself from the focus on monetary 
success and honours awarded by the bourgeois society.7 As a result 
of this nomos, the consecration mechanisms in the literary and 
artistic field – the power to set quality standards and dominate the 
internal discourse – become self-referential: l’art pour l’art. The field 
of literature and art becomes a universe countering the profit logic 
that impregnates the economic and political discourse. The break with 
the ruling powers constitutes the basis of an artist’s independent, 
autonomous existence.8 Autonomous literature and art is a provocation. 
It challenges the pervasive ‘economism’ in society.9
3  P Bourdieu, ‘Die Logik der Felder’ in P Bourdieu and LJD Wacquant (eds), Reflexive 
Anthropologie (Suhrkamp 1996) 124, 134–135; P Bourdieu, Die Regeln der Kunst. Genese und 
Struktur des literarischen Feldes, (Suhrkamp, 1999) (French original: P Bourdieu, Les règles de 
l’art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire, (Éditions du Seuil, 1992)), 253–255, 368.
4  P Bourdieu, R Chartier and R Darnton, ‘Dialog über die Kulturgeschichte’ (1985) 26 Freibeuter 
– Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Kultur und Politik 22, 28.
5  Bourdieu, ‘Die Logik der Felder’, above n 2, 134; J Jurt, Bourdieu (Reclam, 2008) 91–92.
6  Bourdieu, Die Regeln der Kunst, above n 2, 103–105.
7  Ibid 344.
8  Ibid 105.
9  Ibid 342.
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It follows from this configuration of the literary and artistic field that 
an artist seeking to gain recognition among peers must not align her 
work with the tastes of the masses and produce mainstream works 
in the  hope of commercial success. This would be perceived as a 
concession to the predominant profit orientation of society. By contrast, 
the renunciation of commercial interests and the focus on the internal 
quality standards within the literary and artistic field testify to an 
artist’s genuinely literary and artistic orientation. In  consequence, 
the field generates a peculiar reverse economy. An artist can only win 
recognition in the field of literature and art by losing on the territory 
of monetary rewards: the one who loses (in economic terms), wins 
(in artistic terms).10
This reverse economy also determines the structure of the field of 
literature and art. As long as the field is autonomous, the highest 
positions will be held by those artists turning their back on the 
bourgeois economy and the prospect of commercial gains. The 
degree of the field’s autonomy, in other words, depends on whether 
independent artists striving for recognition within the field (limited 
production for other independent artists), or dependent artists 
striving for recognition outside the field (mainstream production for 
the masses), hold the highest hierarchical positions.11
Accordingly, the fight for predominance and leadership in the literary 
and artistic field is a fight between autonomous/independent and 
bourgeois/dependent artists for the power to set quality standards and 
dictate the internal discourse.12 The stronger the position of dependent, 
profit-oriented artists in this fight, the bigger the influence of external 
economic and political players on the structure of the literary and 
artistic field, and the lower the field’s autonomy.13
On the basis of this analysis of the power relations in the literary 
and artistic field, Bourdieu paints an alarming picture of the field’s 
current degree of autonomy. In the light of reduced state subsidies 
10  Ibid 136, 344–345.
11  Ibid 344–345.
12  Ibid 198–203. Within the group of autonomous, independent artists, Bourdieu also 
describes a further fight between established artists presently holding the consecration and 
discourse power, and upcoming avant-garde artists challenging this established position: 198, 
253–255, 379–380.
13  Ibid 344.
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for cultural productions and the rise of culture sponsoring by 
enterprises, he warns of an increasing mutual penetration of the 
world of art and the world of money: more and more literary and 
artistic productions become subject to entrepreneurial marketing 
strategies and commercial pressures.14 With the growing influence 
of external players and profit rationales, the distinction between 
autonomous, independent productions and commercial, dependent 
productions is increasingly blurred. To a growing extent, the profit 
logic of commercial productions also prevails in avant-garde works.15 
Therefore, the autonomy of the field of literature and art is currently 
at risk.16
2. The rationales of copyright revisited
In the light of this analysis, the role of copyright in the field of literary 
and artistic production seems ambiguous. Utilitarian copyright 
theory  regards copyright as a vehicle to encourage the creation of 
literary and artistic works by providing an economic stimulus: the 
promise of monetary rewards is offered to authors as an incentive to 
create new works.17 From the perspective of Bourdieu’s analysis, this 
utilitarian incentive rationale is questionable. It may enhance the 
productivity of dependent artists who share the profit orientation 
of the bourgeois society. Artists following the specific l’art pour l’art 
nomos of the literary and artistic field, by contrast, are primarily 
interested in reputational rewards. They aim at recognition among 
peers. The  incentive scheme underlying copyright law thus appears 
as a risk factor. It may entice autonomous artists away from the 
independent l’art pour l’art logic of the literary and artistic field. 
14  Ibid 530.
15  Ibid 531.
16  Ibid 533.
17  FI Michelman, ‘Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just  Compensation” Law’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review, 165, 1211; SP Calandrillo, 
‘An  Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of 
Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run 
Reward System’ (1998) 9 Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 301, 
310–312; PE Geller, ‘Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship 
Norms?’ in B Sherman and A Strowel, Of Authors and Origins, (Clarendon Press, 1994) 159, 159, 
164–166.
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The offer of copyright seems to be not only a bait to spur creativity 
but also an attempt to persuade autonomous artists to spend time and 
effort on the production of mainstream works.
A less critical picture can be drawn on the basis of the natural law 
argument. This copyright theory posits that the author acquires 
a property right in her work by virtue of the mere act of creation.18 
As the author spends time and effort on the creation of a work, it is 
deemed right and just to afford her the opportunity to reap the fruit 
of this creative labour.19 Copyright law merely recognises formally 
what has already occurred in the course of the act of creation. This 
approach is less directly linked with an incentive scheme. Continental 
European droit d’auteur systems following the natural law approach 
do not only provide strong economic rights but also strong moral 
rights allowing an author to safeguard the unbreakable bond with 
her work as a materialisation of her personality.20 Nonetheless, the 
concept of recognising copyright as a reward for creative labour leads 
to a comparable dilemma. It implies that the author derives financial 
benefits from the exclusive entitlement to exploit a work. This 
reward mechanism favours commercially exploitable productions. 
It seems tailored to the interests of profit-oriented, dependent artists. 
Autonomous authors striving for reputational rewards within their 
own community are less likely to create works that generate substantial 
royalty revenue. Accordingly, the exploitation opportunity secured 
by copyright law offers much less support for their creative efforts.
Finally, even the freedom of expression argument for copyright 
protection appears doubtful in the light of Bourdieu’s analysis. 
According to this line of reasoning, copyright protection ensures 
authors’ independence from any kind of patronage potentially seeking 
to restrict their freedom of expression. With the grant of copyright, 
18  H Desbois, Le droit d’auteur en France (Dalloz, 2nd ed, 1978) 538; H Hubmann, ‘Die Idee 
vom geistigen Eigentum, die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und die 
Urheberrechtsnovelle von 1985’ (1988) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 4, 5.
19  FW Grosheide, Auteursrecht op Maat, (Kluwer, 1986) 128 (argument B).
20  As to continental European moral rights theory, see Geller, above n 16, 169–170; A Strowel, 
‘Droit d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature’ in B Sherman and A Strowel, Of 
Authors and Origins (Clarendon Press, 1994) 235, 236–237; B Edelman, ‘The Law’s Eye: Nature 
and Copyright’ in B Sherman and A Strowel, Of Authors and Origins (Clarendon Press, 1994) 79, 
82–87; E Ulmer, Urheber- und Verlagsrecht (Springer, 1980) 110–111. See Desbois 1978, above 
n 17, 538: ‘L’auteur est protégé comme tel, en qualité de créateur, parce qu’un lien l’unit à l’objet 
de sa création.’
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authors obtain the opportunity to exploit their works and acquire 
a source of income that is independent of patronage and other forms 
of sponsoring.21 Truly independent authors in the sense of Bourdieu’s 
analysis, however, aim at recognition among other independent 
authors who also renounce the profit orientation of the bourgeoisie. 
At the crucial early stage of a career in the area of literary and artistic 
production, the contribution of copyright to an autonomous artist’s 
individual freedom of expression is thus likely to remain limited. 
In  many cases, autonomous artists will have difficulty to derive 
substantial financial benefits from copyright protection. Dependent 
artists with a commercial mainstream orientation, by contrast, will have 
much less difficulty to generate a solid income. This bourgeois group 
of artists, however, follows market dictates anyway. Their production 
is not independent in the sense of the specific l’art pour l’art nomos of 
the literary and artistic field. Strictly speaking, market-oriented artists 
would not even need copyright to ensure freedom of patronage because 
they are not striving for independence of commercial influences in 
the first place. For autonomous artists requiring an extra income to 
keep their focus on independent productions, however, copyright 
has little to offer unless their fame within the group of autonomous 
artists allows them to translate this internal reputation into monetary 
rewards on the art market.
Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the standard rationales of 
copyright  protection with the maxim of l’art pour l’art in the field 
of literary and artistic production. By definition, monetary rewards 
cannot support autonomous artists in their efforts to gain recognition 
among their peers. Instead of supporting independent creations, the 
prospect of commercial exploitation is likely to further mainstream 
productions that may erode the autonomy of the literary and 
artistic field.22
21  NW Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’ (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 283, 
288: ‘Copyright supports a sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from 
reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy.’ For an in-depth analysis of this 
argument, see generally NW Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008).
22  With regard to the impact of continuous expansions of copyright on different kinds 
of creation strategies, see also Y Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’ (1999) 74 New York University Law Review 354.
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The corrosive effect of this configuration of copyright law must not be 
underestimated. In particular, it would be wrong to assume that the 
group of autonomous artists and the impact of the problem are only 
marginal. Bourdieu’s analysis – distinguishing between autonomous 
artists creating art for art’s sake and bourgeois artists seeking to make 
money – is a theoretical model that Bourdieu developed to shed light 
on the power relations in the field of literary and artistic productions. 
His strict theoretical distinction between two prototypes of creators, 
however, need not be applied with the same rigidity when examining 
real-life implications of the incentives offered in copyright law.
In reality, creators are not unlikely to strive for both monetary and 
reputational rewards. To varying degrees, creators of flesh and blood 
are not unlikely to display characteristics of both independent, 
autonomous artists and market-oriented, bourgeois artists. The central 
question, then, is whether a creator’s profit orientation is so strong 
that she is prepared to compromise her own aesthetic (scientific, 
journalistic, etc.) convictions when this is necessary to derive more 
profit from a work.
Once this more practical standard is applied, a creator can be qualified 
as autonomous as long as her interest in sufficient monetary rewards 
does not corrupt her aesthetic (scientific, journalistic, etc.) convictions 
and does not dilute her genuine, artistic expression. Viewed from this 
broader, more practical perspective, Bourdieu’s analysis brings to light 
a core problem of copyright law – a problem that does not remain 
limited to marginal side effects on a specific group of creators and 
a small fraction of literary and artistic productions. Bourdieu’s theory 
raises the general question of the desired degree of autonomous 
aesthetic (scientific, journalistic, etc.) expression in literary and 
artistic works. How truthful are literary and artistic productions that 
benefit from the incentive scheme of copyright law?
Arguably, copyright law should not only be in favour of profit-oriented 
mainstream productions. It should also encourage artists to cultivate 
their own, independent way of expressing themselves – without 
interference of market dictates. Hence, the examination of copyright 
law in the light of Bourdieu’s analysis must not end here. It would 
be wrong to jump to the conclusion that copyright has nothing to 
offer autonomous art and artists. From the perspective of economic 
theory, it is even indispensable to explore copyright’s potential to 
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contribute to the production of autonomous literature and art. At the 
core of  the incentive rationale in copyright law lies the economic 
insight that literary and artistic works constitute ‘public goods’. 
Because of non-rivalry in consumption23 and non-excludability in 
use,24 they are unlikely to be created in sufficient quantities in the 
absence of appropriate incentives.25 The grant of intellectual property 
rights, however, is only one strategy for providing the required 
incentives. A system of public subsidies could solve the problem as 
well.26 As pointed out by Bourdieu, this alternative solution of state 
subsidies is currently unavailable. Therefore, the remaining option 
of recalibrating the copyright system in a way that strengthens the 
autonomy of literature and art is of central importance. To safeguard 
the autonomy of the field, copyright law should become an engine 
of autonomous l’art pour l’art productions.
Before embarking on a survey of potential measures seeking to achieve 
this goal on the basis of copyright law, however, it is necessary to 
explain why this recalibration of the copyright system is desirable 
from the perspective of society as a whole. The proposal of introducing 
a bias in favour of autonomous literature and art in copyright law lacks 
power of persuasion in the absence of a clear indication of benefits for 
society. Therefore, the question arises how a recalibration of copyright 
law in favour of autonomous literary and artistic productions can be 
justified. The aesthetic theories of Friedrich Schiller and Theodor 
Adorno yield important insights in this respect.
3. Need for a bias in favour of autonomous 
literature and art
While Schiller sees works of art as catalysts paving the way for 
an ethical and free society (as discussed in section 3.1), Adorno 
describes the task of art to challenge reality and suggest necessary 
societal changes (3.2). Against this background, it becomes apparent 
23  Use by one actor does not restrict the ability of another actor to benefit as well.
24  Unauthorised parties (‘free riders’) cannot be prevented from use.
25  WW Fisher, ‘Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 1659, 
1700; WM Landes and RA Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 Journal 
of Legal Studies 325, 326; Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox, above n 20, 84–85.
26  RA Posner, ‘Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach’ (2005) 19 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 57, 58–59; Calandrillo, above n 16, 310–312.
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that a copyright system focusing on the furtherance of autonomous 
literature and art is of particular importance. It functions as an engine 
of alternative visions of society that can serve as a reference point for 
necessary changes of social and political conditions (3.3).
3.1. Schiller’s aesthetic theory
Disillusioned by the French Revolution, which had culminated in 
chaos and violence instead of leading to a free and equal society, 
Schiller wrote his letters about mankind’s aesthetic education to 
explore the possibility of a transition from an absolutist, authoritarian 
state to a purified, ethical state that is founded on human reason.27 
As a precondition for this transition, Schiller emphasises the need to 
harmonise human desires with the rules of reason. As it is not the 
destiny of mankind to renounce its natural senses in favour of moral 
laws,28 support for an ethical, reasonable state must come from the 
totality of human dispositions: desire and reason alike. Individuals 
should not only feel an obligation to follow the rules of reason, they 
should feel a desire to do so. If human desires are brought in line with 
the postulates of reason, a revolution will no longer end in chaos and 
violence. It will lead to the establishment of a moral state instead.29
To align human desires with the rules of reason, a catalyst is required 
that brings moral laws not only to people’s heads but also to their 
hearts. Schiller solves this problem by positing that art can serve as 
such a catalyst. Even though incapable of changing mankind directly, 
art can point the way to a change for the better by focusing people’s 
thoughts on the ‘necessary and eternal’, and make them strive for this 
ideal.30 Art is predestined to accomplish this task because it satisfies 
the desire to play and enjoy. Instead of openly criticising people’s 
actions and attitudes, art can improve society in a subtle way by 
making visions of ethical behaviour part of people’s play and pleasure:
27  F Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, edited by KL Berghahn, (Reclam, 
2000) 11–14 [Letter 3].
28  Ibid 28 [Letter 6].
29  Ibid 120–121 [Letter 27].
30  Ibid 36 [Letter 9].
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In vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn their 
actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. Drive 
away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their pleasures, and you 
will banish them imperceptibly from their acts, and length from their 
feelings. Everywhere that you meet them, surround them with great, 
noble, and ingenious forms; multiply around them the symbols of 
perfection, till appearance triumphs over reality, and art over nature.31
Schiller relies on art as a vehicle to let people experience an ideal 
balance between desire and reason until they finally orient their 
actions by moral laws instead of following mere physical necessities. 
A person succumbing to a temptation while knowing that it is against 
the rules of reason feels overpowered by nature. A person fulfilling 
a moral obligation in spite of inner resistance feels forced by reason. 
The aesthetic play, however, reconciles reason with desire, neutralises 
physical and moral constraints and, in consequence, allows mankind 
to enjoy full freedom.32 It enables the individual to experience a state 
of perfection in which neither the power of nature nor the postulates 
of reason restrict possible courses of action: in the aesthetic play, 
mankind experiences humanity in its entirety.33
A true work of art is capable of evoking this equilibrium between 
reason and desire, and this freedom of the mind through appearances 
of beauty that neither reflect nor require reality.34 To accomplish this 
task, the artist must not be a protégé of her time. She must leave the 
realm of reality behind and employ the techniques of art to depict 
a vision of the ultimate ideal.35 In Schiller’s view, the experience 
and enjoyment of this ultimate perfection can pave the way for the 
establishment of a moral society in which individual freedom no 
longer follows from the restriction of the freedom of others but from 
a consensus on ethical norms that corresponds with people’s desires 
– as refined in the aesthetic play.36 An individual driven by physical 
necessity must first experience beauty – the aesthetical balance 
31  Ibid 37 [Letter 9, English translation taken from: ‘Literary and Philosophical essays: French, 
German and Italian. With Introductions and Notes’, The Harvard Classics, vol 32, (Collier, 1910) 
available at the Internet Modern History Sourcebook: <legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/schiller-
education.asp>].
32  Schiller, above n 26, 57–58 [Letter 14].
33  Ibid 60–64 [Letter 15] and 105–106 [Letter 25].
34  Ibid 111–112 [Letter 26].
35  Ibid 34–35 [Letter 9].
36  Ibid 120–121 [Letter 27].
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between desire and rules of reason – before she can actively and freely 
opt for moral norms and moral actions.37 It is thus the task of art to 
prepare mankind for the transition from the physical state of desire 
to the moral state of reason.38
3.2. Adorno’s aesthetic theory
In his aesthetic theory, Theodor Adorno also underlines the societal 
relevance of art. Against the background of the alienation which 
the individual faces in a fully rationalised, efficiency-driven world, 
he warns of the affirmative nature of art. An artwork bringing 
a conciliatory reflection of enchantment into the disenchanted, 
empirical reality offers comfort in the rationalised world and supports 
the unbearable status quo.39 In the light of the inhumanity of the real 
world, art would make itself an accomplice of present and coming 
disasters if it sustained positive visions of society and obscured the 
defects and poorness of reality.40 With the prospect of a better world 
that, as an ultimate truth,41 shimmers through each genuine artwork,42 
art may falsely pretend that existing societal conditions are acceptable. 
Therefore, art is constantly at risk of becoming guilty of supporting 
the inhuman status quo and fortifying present ideologies.43
On the other hand, art must not be condemned altogether as long as 
true art is capable of unmasking the negativity of present societal 
conditions. Showing visions of a better, happier life, art can rouse 
opposition against the existing reality and contribute to necessary 
societal changes.44 True art can play a decisive role in society because 
it generates utopian views of a better life that may become drivers 
of a change for the better. This role of authentic art defines its social 
character: art is the ‘social antithesis’ of society.45 Given this delicate 
position in the social fabric of modern societies, there is a fine line to be 
walked: the artist must relentlessly expose the inhumanity of reality 
37  Ibid 90–91 [Letter 23].
38  Ibid 92 [Letter 23].
39  TW Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, edited by G Adorno and R Tiedemann, (Suhrkamp, 1970) 
10, 34.
40  Ibid 28, 503.
41  Ibid 128, 196–197.
42  Ibid 199–200.
43  Ibid 203.
44  Ibid 25–26, 56.
45  Ibid 9–10, 19, 53.
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without offering any prospect of reconciliation. In doing so, the artist 
creates genuine works that, by their very nature, offer shining visions 
of a better life and a better society in spite of the hopelessness reflected 
in the artworks themselves.46 As an antithesis of the total disaster in 
the real world, art becomes the messenger of an ideal, utopian world.47
There is thus an inescapable dualism in contemporary authentic 
art: the sadness of presenting a happier life as a goal that remains 
unattainable under present societal conditions.48 To accomplish this 
task, art must seek to escape tendencies to undermine and neutralise 
its critical and irrational impetus, such as the efforts of the cultural 
industry to commercialise and canonise even the most rebellious and 
resistant works.49 Reacting to the growing demand for enchantment 
in the disenchanted, rationalised reality,50 the cultural industry 
offers artworks as consumer goods – abstract objects that function as 
a tabula rasa into which the bourgeois purchaser can project her own 
feelings and aspirations.51 As a result, an artwork becomes an echo 
and confirmation of the viewer’s own hopes and attitudes. It becomes 
an escape from the unbearable real world. This, however, leads to the 
‘disartification’ of art. Once it is consumed as an object of pleasure that 
offers comfort in an inhuman world, its critical impetus – the exposure 
of the ugliness of reality as an impulse for societal changes – is negated. 
The purchaser who only projects her own aspirations into the artwork 
can no longer experience the underlying truth. Instead of assimilating 
oneself to the artwork and exploring its genuine meaning,52 a person 
consuming a work of art as an object for the projection of her own 
emotions only seeks to ignore the shameful difference between the 
utopia shimmering through the artwork and the poorness of her own 
life.53 Instead of seeing the artwork as a subject and disappearing in the 
utopian vision of a radical change of society offered by the artwork,54 
the art consumer simply annexes the artwork to other objects of 
possession and deprives it of its genuine meaning by replacing the 
46  Ibid 127, 199.
47  Ibid 55–56.
48  Ibid 204–205.
49  Ibid 32.
50  Ibid 34.
51  Ibid 33.
52  Ibid 27–28.
53  Ibid 32.
54  Ibid 27.
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unpleasant critique of the empirical reality with her own projections. 
The cultural industry initiates and exploits this process leading to the 
neutralisation of art.55
To escape this threat of disqualification, art must insist on its 
difference and autonomy by refusing claims for rule obedience 
and resisting the temptation to fulfil societal expectations. It must 
preserve its opposition and dissonance by producing works of a non-
identical and fragmentary nature that negate the unity of traditional 
productions, fall outside aesthetical categories and bring chaos in 
the established order.56 To mirror the ugliness and futility of present 
society in an authentic way, artworks must become ugly and futile 
themselves. The world of art must become a closed counter universe: 
the last refuge of humanity in an inhuman world that is disfigured 
by deal and profit maxims.57 Remaining alien to the world, true art, 
by definition, is puzzling and gives rise to conflicting interpretations 
based on internal tension in the work or its connection to conflicts in 
society.58 For the final resolution of these tensions and conflicts, society 
as a whole would have to be transformed. It would have to decipher 
the contradictions reflected in authentic works of art and extrapolate 
the underlying ultimate truth that is expressed by simultaneously 
challenging reality and suggesting improvements.59
3.3. Importance of autonomous art
By no means do these two aesthetic theories exhaust the possibilities 
of describing the role of autonomous literary and artistic productions 
in society. Nonetheless, the two examples of an assessment of 
the societal relevance of independent art already show that by 
presenting alternative visions of society, art can play a crucial role 
in the improvement of social and political conditions. Providing this 
additional insight, Schiller’s and Adorno’s aesthetic theories – despite 
obvious conceptual differences – offer answers to questions that go 
beyond Bourdieu’s description of the field of literary and artistic 
production. With the outlined aesthetic theories, Bourdieu’s analysis 
55  Ibid 33.
56  Ibid 41.
57  Ibid 337–338.
58  Ibid 197–198.
59  Ibid 55, 193–196.
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can be supplemented with an assessment of the value and importance 
of artworks for society as a whole: what would be lost if the field of 
literary and artistic production was no longer autonomous? If it were 
dominated by commercial considerations? If literature and art did no 
longer follow its own, independent logic – its ‘nomos’ of self-referential 
l’art pour l’art?
Considering Schiller’s and Adorno’s theories, the answer to these 
questions lies in the potential of art to mirror shortcomings of present 
society and raise a desire for changes for the better. As an independent, 
autonomous observer, the artist is capable of depicting alternatives 
to an insufficient and unacceptable reality. An artwork can unmask 
defects of existing societal conditions and prepare society for the 
transition to a better community. Once the field of literary and artistic 
production loses its autonomy, this constant challenge of reality and 
indispensable training for a better world would be lost. Society would 
remain in a lamentable state of imperfection without the impulses 
necessary to improve the situation. Hence, there is substantial reason 
to recalibrate copyright law and make it an engine of autonomous, 
independent works of true art in the sense of Schiller’s and Adorno’s 
theories.
4. Recalibration of copyright law
Given the threat to the autonomy of literature and art that follows 
from the reduction of state subsidies for independent productions, 
copyright law must take a position in the fight between autonomous/
independent and bourgeois/dependent authors for predominance, 
leadership and consecration power in the literary and artistic 
field. It  must seek to support autonomous art productions in order 
to preserve the autonomy of the field and its potential to generate 
alternative visions of society that can pave the way for necessary 
social and political changes. This need to recalibrate copyright law 
leads to the question: which features of the system are of particular 
importance to autonomous artists following the l’art pour l’art nomos 
of the literary and artistic field? The aforementioned moral rights of 
authors, including the right of attribution and the right to prevent 
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derogatory actions,60 can serve as a first example of rules that may 
be of particular relevance to autonomous authors seeking to preserve 
the integrity of their artistic creations. Commercially oriented authors 
may have less difficulty to accept modifications of their works as long 
as they increase exploitation revenues.
Other copyright rules that offer support for autonomous productions 
enter the picture once Bourdieu’s description of fights for power and 
predominance within the community of autonomous artists is taken 
into consideration. Apart from the competition between autonomous 
and bourgeois artists that defines the level of autonomy of the literary 
and artistic field as a whole, Bourdieu also describes internal fights 
within the group of autonomous artists. This description shows that 
freedom to transform pre-existing works is essential to the constant 
evolution of new avant-garde movements (4.1).
In the light of decreasing state subsidies, copyright law must also 
ensure a redirection of money flows within the field of literary and 
artistic productions – a redirection in favour of autonomous l’art pour 
l’art productions. Therefore, it is necessary to also reconsider and 
refine remuneration mechanisms within the copyright system. A first 
question arising in this context concerns the introduction of a right 
to fair remuneration that can be invoked in the context of contractual 
agreements about the exploitation of literary and artistic works 
(4.2). As autonomous artists may have difficulty to find a publisher, 
producer or art gallery willing to invest in their works, however, 
a direct redistribution of copyright revenue in favour of autonomous 
literature and art must also be considered (4.3).
4.1. Recognition of a right to transformative use
According to Bourdieu’s analysis, newcomers in the community 
of autonomous artists can only establish a new school of thought 
by rebelling against the rules established by the generation of 
autonomous artists that is presently in power. The new generation 
must challenge existing convictions to obtain the power to set its own 
60  See the international recognition of moral rights in Berne Convention, article 6bis. As to the 
recognition of these rights in Anglo-American countries, see G Dworkin, ‘The Moral Right of the 
Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries’ (1995) 19 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law 
& the Arts, 229.
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quality standards and dictate the discourse. It must degrade the ruling 
avant-garde to an arrière-garde.61 The constant evolution of fresh, 
autonomous avant-garde productions thus depends on mechanisms 
that allow new generations of autonomous authors to legitimise 
their unorthodox, new approach by criticising the dogmata of the 
predominant school of thought.
For a new generation to challenge the leading avant-garde, it must 
detect the structural gaps within the texture of already known 
aesthetic positions. It must formulate an alternative artistic position 
in the light of the weaknesses and contradictions of the present state 
of the art.62 The room between the positions that have already been 
taken in the literary and artistic field thus constitute potential starting 
points for an artistic revolution.
Copyright law can support this constant process of renewal within the 
group of autonomous artists by guaranteeing certain user freedoms.63 
To be capable of challenging established positions, an autonomous 
artist must be free to dissociate herself from the dogmata set forth by 
her predecessors. The law can thus enable a new generation of artists 
to destruct an established order and erect a new one by exempting 
the use of protected, pre-existing works for the formulation of a new 
aesthetic position. The idea/expression dichotomy64 ensures that the 
ideas and concepts underlying literary and artistic works remain free 
for this purpose. The freedom to refer to earlier creations, for example 
in quotations and parodies,65 allows a new generation to criticise the 
currently prevailing school of thought. In this way, new autonomous 
61  Bourdieu, above n 2, 253–255.
62  Ibid 372.
63  For a discussion of Bourdieu’s approach in the context of identifying patterns of permissible 
fair use in the sense of US legislation, see MJ Madison, ‘A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use’ 
(2004) 45 William and Mary Law Review 1525, 1627–1642.
64  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 
15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), annex IC (Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) (‘TRIPS’), Art 9(2); World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty (‘WIPO Copyright Treaty’), opened for signature 20 December 
1996, 36 ILM 65, entered into force 6 March 2002, Art 2.
65  See the international recognition of the right of quotation in Berne Convention, article 
10(1). As to the inclusion of parody in this broad quotation concept, see AA  Quaedvlieg, 
‘De parodiërende nabootsing als een bijzondere vorm van geoorloofd citaat’ (1987) RM Themis, 
279. For an example of the development of the right of quotation in a national copyright system, 
see MRF Senftleben, ‘Quotations, Parody and Fair Use’ in PB Hugenholtz, AA Quaedvlieg and 
DJG Visser (eds), A Century of Dutch Copyright Law – Auteurswet 1912–2012 (deLex, 2012) 359, 
online available at <ssrn.com/abstract=2125021>.
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artists can demarcate their new position from previous ones. They can 
lay the foundations for a new avant-garde movement by defining their 
own position in relation to pre-existing works.
Apart from the freedom to use and criticise pre-existing works in 
the process of defining and demarcating a new aesthetic position, 
Bourdieu’s analysis highlights a further freedom of use that is crucial 
to the process of constant renewal in the area of autonomous l’art 
pour l’art productions. To allow a new generation of autonomous 
authors to formulate a new aesthetic position, these newcomers must 
first learn of the positions that have already been taken by previous 
independent artists. Unless they master the history of their particular 
art and know the heritage of former generations of artists, they are 
inhibited from detecting structural gaps that allow them to take 
a  legitimate and plausible next step in the evolution of literary and 
artistic productions.66 Therefore, the guarantee of freedom to use pre-
existing material for the creation of new avant-garde works is only 
one way in which copyright law can support the process of aesthetic 
renewal. In addition, copyright law can support the evolution of new 
avant-garde movements by exempting the use of existing works for 
educational purposes and private study – exemptions that allow new 
generations of autonomous artists to explore the cultural landscape 
and find starting points for the articulation of new positions that 
challenge and supersede established convictions.
Hence, freedom to learn of pre-existing works and freedom to use 
and criticise them for the purpose of establishing a new avant-garde 
movement are of particular importance to authors with an autonomous, 
independent orientation.67 This insight necessitates a change in the 
understanding of the rights to be guaranteed in copyright law. In fact, 
the term ‘copyright’ as such becomes doubtful and appears misleading. 
‘Copyright’ must not content itself with safeguarding an author’s 
66  Bourdieu, above n 2, 385.
67  It must not be overlooked in this context that Bourdieu’s analysis – with the two poles of 
purely bourgeois authors on one side of the spectrum, and purely autonomous authors on the 
other – is a theoretical model. The conclusion drawn here, accordingly, is based on this strict 
theoretical distinction between the two groups. In reality, creators of both camps are not unlikely 
to appreciate the existence of both rights and freedoms to varying degrees. Depending on their 
individual position between the two poles of purely bourgeois and purely autonomous authors, 
they will attach more importance to exploitation rights than user freedoms and vice versa. For 
an analysis of copyright law as an engine of cultural diversity that supports this assumption, 
see Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox, above n 20, 195–199; Benkler, above n 21, 400–412.
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exploitation interests. This traditional concept of exclusive rights 
focuses on the profit orientation of bourgeois authors and the creative 
industry. However, it neglects the dependence of autonomous artists 
on freedom to use pre-existing works for the purpose of developing 
a new avant-garde. Therefore, the concept of authors’ rights must 
be extended to use privileges: a right to make transformative use.68 
The present copyright system already complies with this broader 
conception of authors’ rights when drawing a boundary line between 
protected individual expression on the one hand, and unprotected 
ideas and concepts on the other.69
However, the outlined broader concept of authors’ rights, including 
a right of transformative use, challenges the approach to limitations of 
exclusive exploitation rights in the present copyright system. Insofar 
as broad, flexible exploitation rights are regarded as the rule, and 
limitations of these rights are perceived as exceptions that must be 
construed and applied restrictively,70 the envisaged broader concept 
of authors’ rights requires substantial changes:71 use privileges 
supporting the creative destruction of works, such as the exemption 
of quotations and parodies, must not be qualified as copyright 
limitations in the first place. They are an author’s right to criticise 
pre-existing literary and artistic expression to create room for the 
formulation of a new artistic position. Hence, certain use privileges 
that are seen as copyright limitations in the present system would 
have to be redefined as authors’ rights72 to avoid an impediment of the 
process of creative destruction in the area of autonomous literary and 
artistic productions.
68  Transformative use is understood here in the sense of a productive use that aims to employ 
a protected work in a different manner or for a different purpose, such as the critique of the work 
or its adaptation to achieve a different artistic effect. It is use transforming the original in new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings. For a similar concept developed 
in the context of the US fair use doctrine, see PN Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’ (1990) 103 
Harvard Law Review 1105, 1111.
69  Art 9(2) TRIPS; Art 2 WIPO Copyright Treaty.
70  This traditional dogma of the restrictive interpretation of copyright limitations can be 
found, for instance, in EU copyright systems. For instance, see Infopaq International v Danske 
Dagblades Forening (CJEU, C-5/08, 16 July 2009) [56]–[58].
71  On the basis of similar considerations, C Geiger, ‘Promoting Creativity through Copyright 
Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law’ (2010) 12 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 515, 532–533, argues for introducing a wider 
limitation for creative uses and converting traditional exploitation rights to prohibit the use 
of copyrighted works into a right to receive a fair remuneration.
72  Cf C Geiger, ‘Die Schranken des Urheberrechts im Lichte der Grundrechte – Zur Rechtsnatur 
der Beschränkungen des Urheberrechts’ in RM Hilty and A Peukert, Interessenausgleich im 
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Interestingly, international copyright law can serve as a point of 
departure for this redefinition. With regard to quotations, the Berne 
Convention, in its prevailing French version,73 states: ‘[s]ont licites les 
citations tirées d’une œuvre …’.74 This formulation can be understood 
as an obligation of Berne Union members to exempt quotations from 
the control of the owner of copyright in the underlying work. A mere 
option to limit copyright in certain respects is expressed differently 
in the Convention: ‘[e]st réservée aux législations des pays de l’Union 
la faculté de permettre …’.75 The English text confirms this analysis. 
Stating that ‘[i]t shall be permissible to make quotations from 
a work …’, the English version leaves little doubt about the nature 
of the quotation right. The exemption is mandatory and not optional. 
If parody is qualified as a particular species of quotation,76 it also falls 
within the scope of this guarantee of a right to transformative use in 
the Berne Convention.
In spite of this international framework, the use privilege of making 
quotations and parodies is still qualified and treated as a regular 
copyright limitation in national copyright laws. EU legislation, for 
instance, does not make it clear that the adoption of the right of 
quotation and the right of parody is mandatory for all member states.77 
Moreover, the EU legislator saw no need to ensure that these rights 
prevail over the protection of technological protection measures,78 
and  escape further scrutiny in the light of the three-step test.79 
Urheberrecht (Nomos, 2004) 143, 147–150; MRF Senftleben, ‘Die Bedeutung der Schranken des 
Urheberrechts in der Informationsgesellschaft und ihre Begrenzung durch den Dreistufentest’ 
in RM Hilty and A Peukert, Interessenausgleich im Urheberrecht (Nomos, 2004) 159, 167–170.
73  According to Berne Convention, Art 37(1)(c), the French text prevails in case of differences 
of opinion on the interpretation of the various language versions.
74  Berne Convention, Art 10(1).
75  This formulation is used in Berne Convention, Arts 9(2), 10(2) 10bis(1) and (2).
76  In this sense Quaedvlieg, above n 64, 285, 288; Senftleben, above n 64, 363.
77  In contrast to the mandatory exemption of transient copying in Art 5(1) of the Information 
Society Directive 2001/29, the adoption of Art 5(3)(d) and (k) of the Directive is not mandatory.
78  By contrast, Art 6(4) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29 fails to shield the right of 
quotation and the right of parody from the potential corrosive effect of technological protection 
measures.
79  Art 5(5) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29. For a discussion of the role of the 
three-step test in EU copyright law, see MRF Senftleben, ‘Comparative Approaches to Fair 
Use: An Important Impulse for Reforms in EU Copyright Law’ in GB Dinwoodie (ed) Methods 
and Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2013) 30; J Griffiths, ‘The “Three-
Step Test” in European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions’ (2009) Intellectual Property 
Quarterly, 489; C Geiger, ‘The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?’ (2006) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 683. As to guidelines for the 
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According to article  13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and article  10 of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright 
Treaty), the scope of the three-step test is confined to limitations 
imposed on the exclusive rights of copyright owners:
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the right holder.80
The redefinition of the exemption of quotations and parody as an 
author’s right to transformative use would thus have the effect of 
excluding these use privileges from the ambit of operation of the 
three-step test altogether. However, existing copyright statutes, such 
as EU copyright legislation, do not support this more comprehensive 
conception of authors’ rights.
appropriate application of the test, see C Geiger, J Griffiths and RM  Hilty, ‘Declaration on a 
Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law’ (2008) International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 707; Senftleben, above n 64.
80  Art  13 TRIPS. The provision was modelled on the first three-step test in international 
copyright law enshrined in Berne Convention, Art 9(2). After the TRIPS Agreement, the test 
reappeared in Art 10 WIPO Copyright Treaty. For a discussion of the test’s development in 
international copyright law and its interpretation by WTO Panels, see C Geiger, D Gervais and 
MRF Senftleben, ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National 
Copyright Law’ (2014) 29 American University International Law Review, 581; D Gervais, ‘Fair Use, 
Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts to Conceptualize Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright’ 
(2009–2010) 57 Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 499, 510–511; A Kur, ‘Of Oceans, 
Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-
Step Test?’ (2009) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 287, 307–308; MRF Senftleben, 
‘Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? – WTO Panel Reports 
Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark 
Law’ (2006) 37 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 407; S Ricketson 
and JC  Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights – The Berne Convention and 
Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006) 759–763; Senftleben, above n 64, 43–244; M Ficsor, ‘How 
Much of What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement 
Cases’ (2002) 192 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur, 111; J Oliver, ‘Copyright in the WTO: 
The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test’ (2002) 25 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts, 119; 
DJ Brennan, ‘The Three-Step Test Frenzy: Why the TRIPS Panel Decision might be considered 
Per Incuriam’ (2002) Intellectual Property Quarterly 213; J  Reinbothe and S  von  Lewinski, The 
WIPO Treaties 1996 – The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty – Commentary and Legal Analysis (Butterworths, 2002); M Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and 
the Internet – The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their Interpretation and Implementation (Oxford University 
Press, 2002); J Ginsburg, ‘Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the 
“Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions’ (2001) 190 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 13.
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Nonetheless, the courts may provide considerable breathing space 
for certain forms of transformative use, in particular quotations and 
parody. In the decision Infopaq/DDF, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) adhered to the traditional dogma of a strict 
interpretation of copyright limitations. Scrutinising the mandatory 
exemption of transient copies in article 5(1) of the Information Society 
Directive (ISD),81 the Court pointed out that for the interpretation of 
each of the cumulative conditions of the limitation, it should be borne 
in mind:
that, according to settled case-law, the provisions of a directive which 
derogate from a general principle established by that directive must 
be interpreted strictly … This holds true for the exemption provided 
for in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29, which is a derogation from 
the general principle established by that directive, namely the 
requirement of authorisation from the rightholder for any reproduction 
of a protected work.82
According to the Court:
[t]his is all the more so given that the exemption must be interpreted 
in the light of Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29, under which that 
exemption is to be applied only in certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder.83
81  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] 
OJ L 167, 10.
82  Infopaq International v Danske Dagblades Forening (CJEU, C-5/08, 16 July 2009) [56]–[57].
83  Ibid [58].
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The CJEU thus established the rule that copyright limitations had 
to be construed narrowly. In Football Association Premier League, 
however, this decision did not hinder the Court from emphasising 
with regard to the same exemption – transient copying in the sense of 
article 5(1) ISD – the need to guarantee the proper functioning of the 
limitation and ensure an interpretation that takes due account of the 
exception’s objective and purpose. The Court explained that, in spite 
of the required strict interpretation, the effectiveness of the limitation 
had to be safeguarded.84 On the basis of these considerations, the Court 
concluded that the transient copying at issue in Football Association 
Premier League, performed within the memory of a satellite decoder 
and on a television screen, was compatible with the three-step test of 
article 5(5) ISD.85
For the purposes of the present inquiry, it is of particular interest that 
in Painer/Der Standard, the Court confirmed this line of argument 
with regard to the right of quotation laid down in article 5(3)(d) ISD. 
The Court underlined the need for an interpretation of the conditions 
set forth in article 5(3)(d) that enables the effectiveness of the quotation 
right and safeguards its purpose.86 More specifically, it clarified that 
article 5(3)(d) was:
intended to strike a fair balance between the right of freedom of 
expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and 
the reproduction right conferred on authors.87
In its further decision in Deckmyn/Vandersteen, the CJEU followed 
the  same path with regard to the parody exemption in article 5(3)(k) 
ISD. As in Painer/Der Standard, the Court bypassed the dogma of 
a  strict interpretation of copyright limitations by underlining the 
need to ensure the effectiveness of the parody exemption88 as a means 
to balance copyright protection against freedom of expression.89
84  Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure (CJEU, C-403/08 and C-429/08, 4 October 
2011) [162]–[163].
85  Ibid [181].
86  Eva Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH (CJEU, C-145/10, 1 December 2011) [132]–[133].
87  Ibid [134].
88  Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Vandersteen (CJEU, C-201/13, 3 September 2014) [22]–[23].
89  Ibid [25]–[27].
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In practice, the courts may thus give copyright limitations that support 
transformative use a status that comes close to an author’s right – even 
though the underlying copyright statute, such as the Information 
Society Directive in the EU, does not qualify these limitations as rights 
but includes them in the catalogue of exceptions to exclusive rights 
instead. As the examples taken from CJEU jurisprudence demonstrate, 
the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression plays a crucial role 
in this context.90 Relying on article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the CJEU could interpret the quotation right and the parody exemption 
less strictly than limitations without a comparably strong freedom of 
speech underpinning. In both the Painer and the Deckmyn decision, 
the Court emphasised the need to achieve a  ‘fair balance’ between, 
in particular, ‘the rights and interests of authors on the one hand, 
and the rights of users of protected subject-matter on the other.’91 The 
Court thus referred to quotations and parodies as user ‘rights’ rather 
than mere user ‘interests’.
Does this mean that there is no need for reforms? Does it mean 
that, in practice, the right of transformative use already exists by 
virtue of court decisions, even though it is hidden in the catalogue 
of exceptions in many national copyright statutes? For at least 
two reasons, the answer to these questions can hardly be in the 
affirmative. First, a  legislative reform that removes use privileges 
for transformative use from the catalogue of exceptions and openly 
redefines them as authors’ rights – with the same status as traditional 
exploitation rights – would make the particular importance of these 
use privileges visible within the copyright statute itself. It would 
allow an internal balancing of different rights when the courts have 
to decide on quotations and parodies. This seems more satisfactory 
90  As to the influence of freedom of speech guarantees on copyright, cf C  Geiger, 
‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the European Union’ (2006) 37 International Review of Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law, 371; A Strowel, F Tulkens and D Voorhoof (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté 
d’expression (Editions Larcier, 2006); PB Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Europe’ in N Elkin-Koren and NW Netanel (eds), The Commodification of Information (Kluwer, 
2002) 239; S Macciacchini, Urheberrecht und Meinungsfreiheit (Stämpfli, 2000); Benkler, above 
n 21, 355; Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’, above n 20, 283.
91  Eva Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH (CJEU, C-145/10, 1  December 2011), case 
C-145/10, Eva Maria Painer/Standard VerlagsGmbH, para. [132]; Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds 
VZW v Vandersteen (CJEU, C-201/13, 3  September 2014, case C-201/13, Deckmyn and 
Vrijheidsfonds VZW/Vandersteen, para.) [26].
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than the present practice of balancing copyright against freedom of 
expression as an external influence factor leading to an exceptionally 
broad application of a copyright limitation that, in principle, would 
have to be construed narrowly.92
Second, it must not be overlooked that quotations and parodies are 
longstanding and well-established copyright limitations. The courts 
may have much more difficulty to arrive at satisfactory solutions when 
it comes to other cases of transformative use that are not, or at least 
less clearly, reflected in the catalogue of copyright limitations. With 
the constant evolution of new artistic practices, it cannot be ruled 
out that an impediment of autonomous art productions comes to the 
fore and that copyright law, in the absence of a formal recognition of 
a right to transformative use, becomes an obstacle to the evolution 
of new independent art. Sound sampling artists, for instance, face 
copyright claims as well as neighbouring rights claims of phonogram 
producers. The more snippets of pre-existing sound recordings they 
use, the higher will be the risk of infringement. The focus on the 
protection of exploitation interests in existing sound recordings may 
thus have a deterrent, corrosive effect on their creativity. In particular, 
this bias is likely to impede so-called ‘collage sampling’ using layers 
of quantitatively or qualitatively insignificant parts of pre-existing 
recordings to create new musical works.93 In contrast to traditional 
quotation and parody cases, the courts seem much more reluctant to 
make particular efforts to offer room for transformative use in sound 
sampling cases.94 In Germany, for example, sampling artists had to 
argue their case all the way up to the German Federal Constitutional 
92  With regard to the question of internal and external balancing exercises, see T  Dreier, 
‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’, 
in R Dreyfuss, D Leenheer-Zimmerman and H First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property. Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Economy (Oxford University Press, 2001) 295.
93  See DM Morrison, ‘Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and Audience Recording’ (2008) 
19 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 75, 96, who warns of a 
corrosive effect on the so-called ‘collage paradigm’ in sampling.
94  As to the preference given to exploitation interests instead, see, for instance, Metall auf 
Metall II, Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], I  ZR  182/11, 13 December 
2012, reported in [2013] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 614; Metall auf Metall, 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], I ZR 112/06, 20 November 2008, reported 
in [2009] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 403. For a translation of the latter case into 
English, see N Conley and T Braegelmann, ‘Metall auf Metall: The Importance of the Kraftwerk 
Decision for the Sampling of Music in Germany’ (2009) 56 Journal of the Copyright Society of 
the U.S.A., 1017. For case comments, see BHM Schippers, ‘Het chilling effect van Kraftwerk 
I/II op sound sampling: pleidooi voor zelfregulering ter bevordering van samplegebruik’ 
(2014) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 105; FJ Dougherty, ‘RIP, MIX and 
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Court to receive the confirmation that, besides the property interests 
of copyright holders and phonogram producers, their right to freedom 
of art had to be given sufficient room as well.95 Other forms of collage 
art, such as film and photo compositions, are likely to raise similar 
problems. The formal recognition of a right to transformative use in 
copyright law could thus make a difference in these cases – not only 
on paper but also in practice.
A last question concerns the scope of the right to transformative use 
that should be recognised in copyright law. As pointed out above, 
Bourdieu’s analysis does not only highlight the importance of freedom 
to use and criticise pre-existing works in the process of defining and 
demarcating a new aesthetic position. It also sheds light on the need 
to allow artists of a new generation to learn of the positions that 
have already been taken by predecessors. Therefore, the question 
arises whether a right to transformative use should only cover core 
areas, such as the making of quotations, parodies and collages, or be 
extended to peripheral areas, such as educational use, library use, and 
private studying.96
The problem with these latter categories is that, unlike the freedom 
of quotation, parody and collage, they do not lie at the core of the 
creative process as such. Use privileges for educational and cultural 
heritage institutions are crucial to the dissemination of information 
and the guarantee of equal access to information in the information 
society. However, they are not directly linked with the process of 
creation. It  is unclear whether an art student or a library user will 
sooner or later embark on the creation of a literary or artistic work. 
Use privileges for educational and cultural heritage institutions are 
investments in potential acts of creation that may take place in the 
future. They increase the likelihood of users receiving sufficient 
inspiration for the creation of a new literary or artistic work. However, 
they operate in a preliminary, preparatory phase. Moreover, it can 
hardly ever be ascertained whether the use of services of educational 
BURN: Bemerkungen zu aktuellen Entwicklungen im Bereich des digitalen Sampling nach US-
amerikanischem und internationalen Recht’ (2007) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
– Internationaler Teil, 481.
95  Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Federal Constitutional Court], 1  BvR  1585/13, 31 
May 2016 available at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/ 
2016/05/rs20160531_1bvr158513.html>.
96  For a discussion of this question, see also Senftleben, above n 64, 39–41.
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institutions, archives, museums and libraries, is consumptive or 
transformative. This dilemma clearly comes to the fore in the case 
of private copying. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of 
contextual factors that could reliably indicate whether the copying 
takes place for mere entertainment and enjoyment purposes, or for the 
studying of aesthetic positions that will finally lead to a new literary 
or artistic production.
Given these conceptual and practical difficulties, it seems advisable 
to confine the recognition of a right to transformative use to use 
privileges that directly support the process of creation, such as a 
quotation right that permits the taking of parts of a pre-existing work 
to make a comment, a parody right that permits the evocation of a 
pre-existing work to express humour or mockery, a collage right that 
permits the composition of a new work on the basis of fragments of 
pre-existing works.
4.2. Refinement of remuneration mechanisms
As explained above, Bourdieu’s analysis casts doubt upon standard 
justifications of copyright protection. In particular, the focus on the 
motivating power of monetary rewards in current copyright law is 
questionable. As autonomous authors attach more importance to 
reputational rewards, the prospect of copyright protection does not 
necessarily spur their creativity. Taking Bourdieu’s assumptions to the 
extremes, it could be said that autonomous authors, by definition, 
have no interest in monetary rewards. As winning in economic terms 
implies losing in artistic terms, commercial success may even be seen as 
undesirable. Hence, one might be tempted to assume that autonomous 
authors need not be remunerated for their work.
This cynical line of reasoning, however, follows from a 
misunderstanding of the above critique of the standard rationales of 
copyright protection in the light of Bourdieu’s analysis. It is correct 
to say that the reliance of traditional copyright theories on the power 
of monetary incentives is questionable. Authors with an independent 
l’art pour l’art orientation are unlikely to be more creative and more 
productive when copyright protection is offered as a bait. However, 
it would be incorrect to infer from these doubts about a standard 
argument for copyright protection that autonomous authors should 
not receive any remuneration for their work. The reason for securing 
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this remuneration, however, is not the utilitarian incentive rationale. 
By contrast, an appropriate remuneration must be guaranteed because 
of social considerations and the need for equal treatment.
As market-oriented authors, autonomous authors have to earn a living. 
Therefore, it is a matter of fairness and equality to remunerate not 
only bourgeois authors but also autonomous authors for their creative 
work. From a social perspective, it may be added that the need to 
take measures to ensure an appropriate remuneration is even more 
pressing in the case of autonomous authors because this group may 
fail to attach sufficient importance to revenue streams when it comes 
to negotiations with producers and disseminators seeking to exploit 
their works (exploiters). As long as a certain mode of exploitation is 
likely to yield attractive reputational rewards, autonomous authors 
may be tempted to give their works away at a price that does not 
appropriately reflect their market value. Hence, the question arises 
how copyright law can ensure that autonomous creators receive a fair 
remuneration for their creative labour. The answer to this question 
can hardly be found in the very nature of copyright itself. Copyright 
law ensures that authors’ exploitation rights are marketable. However, 
autonomous artists in the sense of Bourdieu’s sociological analysis 
may never attain a bargaining position that allows them to ensure 
a decent income on the basis of copyright because their works are 
not made for the tastes of the masses in the first place. While these 
consequences may be seen as a normal result in a market economy 
driven by supply and demand, they become problematic when it is 
considered that copyright, as pointed out above, is often presented 
as a right that serves the individual interests of creators. If the whole 
group of creators with a l’art pour l’art orientation does not have 
the bargaining power to derive substantial economic benefit from 
copyright,97 this problem may discredit the protection system as 
97  In this regard, see the analyses of the bargaining position and income situation of 
individual creators by M  Kretschmer et al, 2011 Copyright Contracts and Earnings of Visual 
Creators: A Survey of 5,800 British Designers, Fine Artists, Illustrators and Photographers 
(Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management (CIPPM), 2011) available at <ssrn.com/
abstract=1780206>; J Weda et al, Wat er speelt – De positie van makers en uitvoerend kunstenaars 
in de digitale omgeving, (SEO Economisch Onderzoek, 2011), available at <www.rijksoverheid.nl/
documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/04/11/rapport-wat-er-speelt.html>; PB Hugenholtz 
and L Guibault, Auteurscontractenrecht: naar een wettelijke regeling?, (Institute for Information 
Law (IViR), 2004) available at <www.ivir.nl/publicaties/overig/auteurscontractenrecht.pdf> 
(unavailable from original source but accessible via archive.org; copy on file with editors).
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a whole.98 If copyright only serves as a vehicle to vest the creative 
industries with strong rights in information products while these 
rights are defended as a means to remunerate authors, the creators of 
literary and artistic works – including the group of autonomous artists 
that is often depicted as the prototype of the ‘romantic author’ – only 
function as a dummy to conceal the industry’s insatiable appetite for 
continuously expanding exclusive rights. As a result, the arguments 
advanced in favour of copyright can be unmasked as false rhetoric99 
and the protection system is in danger of losing its support in society. 
The system’s social legitimacy is put at risk.
To avoid this erosion of copyright’s acceptance in society, the 
lawmaker can seek to reduce the exposure to market forces and adopt 
measures that strengthen the position of creators vis-à-vis exploiters. 
In 2002, an example of legislation in this area – an Act on Copyright 
Contract Law – entered into force in Germany. This legislation confers 
upon authors a right to fair remuneration besides the traditional 
exploitation rights. By virtue of § 32(1) of the German Copyright Act 
(UrhG), as amended by the 2002 Copyright Contract Act, authors have 
the right to demand the modification of a contract about a work’s 
exploitation that fails to provide for a fair remuneration. § 32(2) UrhG 
complements this right to fair remuneration by making it clear that 
so-called ‘common remuneration rules’ established in negotiations 
between a representative association of authors on the one hand, and 
an individual exploiter or an association of exploiters on the other 
hand (§  36 UrhG), are to be deemed ‘fair’ in this sense by virtue 
of the law.
98  For empirical evidence of the precarious income situation of creators (not limited to the 
group of autonomous artists), see, for example, Kretschmer et al, above n 96. As to the need for 
a strengthening of the bargaining position of authors, see Weda et al, above n 96.
99  Cf SE Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 1197, 
1197–1198, pointing out that ‘although some copyright protection indeed may be necessary 
to induce creative activity, copyright doctrine now extends well beyond the contours of the 
instrumental justification. The 1976 statute and more recent amendments protect authors even 
when no plausible argument can be made that protection will enhance the incentive for authors 
to create’.
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Although the German Copyright Contract Act has now been in 
effect for more than 10 years, it has not led to the envisaged general 
improvement of the income situation of authors.100 Authors seem 
hesitant to assert their remuneration right in court. As an exception 
to this rule, translators started court procedures that finally led to 
first decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice on the fair 
remuneration question.101 On balance, however, the determinants of 
what constitutes a fair remuneration in an individual case still seem 
too vague to allow the effective use and enforcement of the new right. 
As the party invoking the right to fair remuneration, the burden of 
proving that a contractually agreed remuneration falls short of the 
legally guaranteed fair remuneration rests on the author. Hence, she 
also carries the risk and costs of showing that a certain remuneration 
is to be deemed fair in the relevant sector of the creative industry, 
and that the concluded contract does not provide for this fair 
remuneration.102
For cases in which no common remuneration rules are available, § 32(2) 
UrhG indicates that a remuneration can be considered fair when it 
complies with the remuneration that, according to the customary 
practices in the sector concerned, an author could reasonably expect 
in light of the scope and reach of the granted right, the duration and 
time of the use, and other circumstances relevant to the individual 
case.103 These flexible factors, however, can hardly clarify the 
conceptual contours of the fair remuneration right. In the absence of 
model contracts or other customary remuneration schemes that come 
close to common remuneration rules in the sense of §  36 UrhG, an 
author will still have difficulty to prove that a contractually agreed 
100  See the recent analyses by H Maas, ‘Kulturelle Werke – mehr als nur ein Wirtschaftsgut’ 
(2016) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, 207, 209, and K-N Peifer, ‘Urhebervertragsrecht 
in der Reform: Der „Kölner Entwurf“’ (2015) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
– Praxis im Immaterialgüter- und Wettbewerbsrecht, 1, 1–2; as well as earlier comments by 
G Schulze, ‘Vergütungssystem und Schrankenregelungen’ (2005) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht, 828, which in principle were shared by A Dietz, ‘Das Urhebervertragsrecht in 
Deutschland’ in RM Hilty and C Geiger (eds), Impulse für eine europäische Harmonisierung des 
Urheberrechts (Springer, 2007) 465. However, Dietz qualified the first common remuneration rule 
that had been established under the new German legislation as a success of the system as a 
whole. See Dietz at 473–474.
101  See Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], I ZR 38/07 and I ZR 230/06, 7 October 
2009, reported in (in German) <www.bundesgerichtshof.de>. This case law will be discussed in 
more detail below.
102  Schulze, above n 99, 829–830; Dietz, above n 99, 469.
103  Schulze, above n 99, p. 595.
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remuneration is not fair on the basis of this vague definition of fairness 
based on the custom in a given sector.104 Similarly, the author will have 
difficulty in assessing the risk of litigation about the remuneration 
question as long as there is no reliable information on the customary 
remuneration.
Against this background, the additional option to invoke § 36 UrhG 
and formally establish common remuneration rules in collective 
negotiations between an association of authors and industry 
representatives is of particular practical importance. By virtue of 
§ 32(2) UrhG, a standard remuneration scheme of this type constitutes 
a legally binding definition of the fair remuneration in the industry 
sector concerned. A standard remuneration scheme in the sense of 
§ 32(2) thus provides the legal certainty necessary to assess the chances 
of court procedures. It can also serve as a yardstick for proving the 
unfairness of a remuneration that does not comply with the standard 
described in the remuneration scheme.
In Germany, the Common Remuneration Rules for Writers of German 
Fiction105 constitute a prominent example of remuneration rules that 
were concluded on the basis of the German Copyright Contract Act 
in negotiations between the Association of German Writers in the 
United Services Trade Union Ver.di and several publishers.106 As no 
representative association of publishers entered the negotiations,107 
it was difficult to foresee the impact of this standard remuneration 
rule on the sector as a whole. The fact that the German Ministry of 
Justice itself finally decided to mediate informally between the parties 
to ensure the adoption of the remuneration rules mirrors the difficulty 
of the negotiations.108
104  Schulze, above n 99, 829–830; AA Wandtke, ‘Der Anspruch auf angemessene Vergütung für 
Filmurheber nach § 32 UrhG’ (2010) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler 
Teil 704, 707.
105  These common remuneration rules are available (in German) at <www.bmj.de/media/
archive/962.pdf>.
106  The rules were signed, for instance, by Rowohlt, S Fischer and Random House. See A Dietz 
in G Schricker, Urheberrecht – Kommentar (CH Beck, 3rd ed, 2006) 797.
107  See Deutscher Bundestag, 3  May 2004, Kurzprotokoll der 14. Sitzung (öffentlich) der 
Enquete-Kommission ‘Kultur in Deutschland’, Protokoll Nr 15/14, 13/4–13/5.
108  The mediation was informal in the sense that it was no formal mediation procedure with 
a dispute commission under § 36a UrhG. See Dietz, above n 99, 797; Schulze, above n 99, 830.
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Given the scarcity of common remuneration rules in the sense 
of § 36 UrhG,109 it is tempting for the courts to make extensive use 
of existing rules. As already indicated above, the German Federal 
Court of Justice had the opportunity to clarify the scope of common 
remuneration rules in two cases that had been initiated by translators. 
A collectively agreed remuneration rule for translators in the sense of 
§ 36 UrhG was not available for a decision in these cases. Moreover, 
the Federal Court of Justice had serious doubts about the customary 
remuneration in the translation sector. Referring to the aforementioned 
general definition of ‘fair remuneration’ in §  32(2) UrhG, the Court 
pointed out that compliance with customary remuneration practices 
in a particular sector may nonetheless be insufficient in the light of the 
general fairness criteria formulated by the legislator:
Even if a particular honorarium – as in this case – is customary in 
the sector, this does not necessarily mean that it is fair. By contrast, 
a given remuneration is only fair when it equally takes account of the 
interests of the author besides those of the exploiter.110
Having neither a common remuneration rule in the sense of §  36 
UrhG nor an appropriate customary remuneration scheme in the sense 
of §  32(2) UrhG at its disposal, the Federal Court of Justice finally 
turned to the Common Remuneration Rules for Writers of German 
Fiction as a point of departure for determining the fair remuneration 
of translators.111 By analogy, the Court used these Common 
Remuneration Rules as a guideline for its decision on a  fair level of 
remuneration for translators. This widening of the field of application 
of common remuneration rules is remarkable because the Common 
109  In Germany, the number of common remuneration rules in the sense of §  36 UrhG is 
growing. Cf A Dietz, ‘Schutz der Kreativen (der Urheber und ausübenden Künstler) durch das 
Urheberrecht oder Die fünf Säulen des modernen kontinentaleuropäischen Urheberrechts’ 
(2015) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil 309, 315–316. The scope 
of these rules, however, is often limited to specific groups of authors and exploiters. For example, 
see the initiatives in the area of public broadcasting described by P Weber, ‘Rahmenverträge 
und gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln nach Urhebervertragsrecht – aus der Praxis des ZDF’ (2013) 
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 740, 742–745. On balance, the result can thus still be 
seen as unsatisfactory. See G Spindler, ‘Reformen der Vergütungsregeln im Urhebervertragsrecht’ 
(2012) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 921, 921.
110  German Federal Court of Justice, 7 October 2009, I ZR 38/07, 11, with case comment by 
R Jacobs at (2009) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1148, 1150; German Federal Court 
of Justice I ZR 230/06, 12, available (in German) at <www.bundesgerichtshof.de>.
111  German Federal Court of Justice, 7  October 2009, I  ZR  38/07, 16; German Federal 
Court of Justice, 7  October 2009, I  ZR 230/06, 15–16; both reported in (in German) <www.
bundesgerichtshof.de>.
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Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction explicitly exclude 
applicability to translated works.112 In addition, the Federal Court of 
Justice was unimpressed by the fact that only one of the two cases 
brought by translators concerned fiction works. The second case was 
about translations of non-fiction books. The Court, however, also 
surmounted this hurdle of ‘double’ analogy. It did not matter that the 
case concerned translators instead of writers, and it did not matter 
that it concerned non-fiction instead of fiction books:
Even though the remuneration rules … are not directly applicable to 
publication contracts for non-fiction books, there are no prevailing 
concerns against their use for the purpose of determining a fair 
remuneration for the translation of a non-fiction book. According to 
the findings of the Court of Appeals, none of the parties argued and 
no other circumstances suggest that the conditions of publication 
contracts for non-fiction books differ from those of contracts over 
fiction works to such an extent that the remuneration rules for writers 
could not be taken into account.113
Using the Common Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction 
as a guideline for the development of a fair remuneration standard 
for translators, the Court finally ruled that translators are entitled to 
2 per cent of the net retail price of hardcover editions and 1 per cent 
in the case of paperback editions. This amounts to one-fifth of the 
remuneration which, according to the Common Remuneration Rules 
for Writers of German Fiction, is due to writers. If the publisher 
guarantees an honorarium that can be deemed reasonable in light of 
the custom in the sector, this right to fair remuneration is reduced to 
0.8 per cent for hardcover sales and 0.4 per cent for paperback sales. 
Moreover, this reduced royalty only needs to be paid as of the 5,000th 
copy sold. In addition, translators are entitled to 50 per cent of the net 
profits from the commercialisation of ancillary rights.114
112  See Gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln für Autoren belletristischer Werke in deutscher Sprache, 
available at <www.bmj.de/media/archive/962.pdf>, 1 n 1, on the one hand, and German Federal 
Court of Justice, 7 October 2009, I ZR 38/07, 17, and German Federal Court of Justice, 7 October 
2009, I ZR 230/06, 16, <www.bundesgerichtshof.de>, on the other hand.
113  See German Federal Court of Justice, 7  October 2009, I  ZR  230/06, [34], <www.
bundesgerichtshof.de>.
114  See German Federal Court of Justice, 7  October 2009, I  ZR  38/07, 18–23, and German 
Federal Court of Justice, 7 October 2009, I ZR 230/06, 18–23, both <www.bundesgerichtshof.
de>. Nonetheless, this level of fair remuneration did not meet the expectations of translators. 
Cf Dietz, above n 99, 469.
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This jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice shows that common 
remuneration rules established under §  36 UrhG can have a broad 
field of application. In particular, the courts may extend the scope of 
these rules to parties who have not been involved in the underlying 
negotiations. A common remuneration rule may become a general 
yardstick for the establishment of fair remuneration standards in a 
given sector even though it was only concluded between specific 
parties and for a specific group of creators. On its merits, this 
jurisprudence transforms common remuneration rules into generally 
binding legal instruments with a considerable impact on remuneration 
standards in the respective segment of the creative industry.
On the one hand, this approach can have positive effects for authors 
in a sector where no agreement on a common remuneration rule can 
be reached. By invoking remuneration rules of a related sector or 
a related group, German courts can still arrive at a fair remuneration 
standard in these cases and improve the income situation of authors 
by reference to remuneration standards in a comparable field. On the 
other hand, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice can 
easily become an additional obstacle to negotiations on common 
remuneration rules in the sense of § 36 UrhG. If it is at all possible 
to find individual exploiters or business associations that are willing 
to speak about common remuneration rules in a particular branch, 
these exploiters and associations may be reluctant to enter into 
formal negotiations because of the risk of resulting fair remuneration 
standards being declared applicable to the whole sector afterwards by 
the courts. Given this risk of generalisation, interested enterprises and 
associations may also face pressure from other players in the relevant 
sector who fear that the establishment of common remuneration rules 
in one particular branch may finally affect remuneration standards in 
the entire sector.
In spite of these problems, the underlying recipe – the combination 
of a right to fair remuneration with the possibility of establishing 
common remuneration standards in negotiations between authors 
and the creative industry – served as a model for other countries 
also seeking to enhance the credibility of the copyright system by 
strengthening the position of individual authors vis-à-vis commercial 
exploiters of their works. In the Netherlands, for instance, legislation 
that copies the core elements of the German system was adopted 
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in 2015.115 Regardless of this export success, however, the question 
remains how fair remuneration legislation could be rendered more 
effective in practice. A clearer definition of the underlying concept 
of fairness, a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to evidence 
of remuneration standards in a given sector, extra incentives for the 
creative industry to enter into collective negotiations with associations 
of authors and, as a last resort, the imposition of a legal obligation 
to establish common remuneration rules could be considered in this 
context.
In the drafting process underlying the present German legislation, 
a far-reaching obligation to accept common remuneration standards 
was contemplated with regard to situations where the parties involved 
in negotiations, finally, could not reach agreement. A common 
remuneration rule could then also have been established in compulsory 
settlement procedures or through a court decision.116 This proposal, 
however, was rejected because of fears that it would encroach upon 
fundamental freedoms of enterprises and business associations, 
in particular the general freedom of action and the negative freedom 
of not being obliged to enter into coalitions guaranteed in the 
German constitution.117 Legislation that imposes a de facto obligation 
115  See the Law of 30 June 2015 changing the Dutch Copyright Act and the Neighbouring Rights 
Act in connection with the strengthening of the position of authors and performing artists in 
contracts concerning copyright and neighbouring rights (Copyright Contract Act), Staatsblad 
2015, 257, which led to a new section in the Dutch Copyright Act (Arts  25b–25h) dealing 
specifically with authors’ contract rights. As to the preparatory work for this new legislation, 
see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 12 June 2012, ‘Wetsvoorstel auteurscontractenrecht’, 
Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 308, (2013) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media en informatierecht, 23; 
B J Lenselink, ‘Auteurscontractenrecht 2.0 – Het wetsvoorstel inzake het auteurscontractenrecht’ 
(2013) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 7; E  Wybenga, ‘Ongebonden 
werk – Is de literaire sector gebaat bij het voorontwerp auteurscontractenrecht?’ (2011) 
Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 41; D Peeperkorn, ‘De lange geschiedenis 
van het auteurscontractenrecht’ (2010) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 
167; JP  Poort and JJM  Theeuwes, ‘Prova d’Orchestra – Een economische analyse van het 
voorontwerp auteurscontractenrecht’ (2010) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 
137; MRF Senftleben, ‘Exportschlager deutsches Urhebervertragsrecht? Het voorontwerp 
auteurscontractenrecht in Duits perspectief’ (2010) Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en 
informatierecht, 146; H  Cohen  Jehoram, ‘Komend auteurscontractenrecht’ (2008) Intellectuele 
eigendom en reclamerecht, 303; PB Hugenholtz and L Guibault, above n 96.
116  See Deutscher Bundestag, 26 June 2001, ‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Stärkung der 
vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden Künstlern’, Drucksache 14/6433, 4 [§ 36(3), 
(5)–(8)], 17.
117  See Grundgesetz [German Basic Law], Arts 2(1), 9, available online at <www.bundestag.de/
bundestag/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_01/245122>; Cf H Schack, ‘Neuregelung des 
Urhebervertragsrechts’ (2001) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 453, 462. See also NP Flechsig 
59
2 . CoPyRIGht, CReAtoRS AND SoCIety’S NeeD FoR AUtoNoMoUS ARt
to establish common remuneration rules thus seems excessive.118 
The current discussion about an amendment of the German system, 
however, includes the proposal to make the concept of fairness more 
concrete by pointing out that a fair remuneration, in principle, 
requires more than a one-time ‘buy out’ payment. Instead, the author 
should continuously receive a share of the revenue accruing from the 
exploitation of her work.119
Given the various problems identified in the ongoing debate, copyright 
legislation seeking to improve the income situation of creators should 
not exclusively rely on the recognition of a right to fair remuneration 
and the vague hope that agreements on appropriate remuneration 
standards will evolve from negotiations between authors and the 
creative industry. By contrast, additional instruments are necessary to 
ensure that authors receive a fair monetary reward for their creative 
work.
Again, Bourdieu’s analysis can offer important impulses in this 
regard. While a general right to fair remuneration ex ante may be of 
particular importance to bourgeois authors whose works are likely 
to be  commercially successful in the marketplace, the difficulty of 
providing evidence for a certain level of standard remuneration in 
a specific field of art is likely to constitute an almost insurmountable 
hurdle for autonomous authors. As their works do not follow market 
dictates and may be avant-garde productions not following known 
patterns, a  remuneration concept presupposing the existence of 
a customary level of fair remuneration seems inapt from the outset. 
Autonomous artists may also fear negative reactions in the art 
sector concerned when they insist on the right to fair remuneration. 
Facing  a  relatively small circle of investors and producers, an 
autonomous artist may be concerned about seeing her name being 
added to a ‘black list’ of creators with whom exploiters do not want to 
work because of past disputes about an adequate level of remuneration.
and K  Hendricks, ‘Zivilprozessuales Schiedsverfahren zur Schließung urheberrechtlicher 
Gesamtverträge – Zweckmäßige Alternative oder Sackgasse?’ (2000) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und 
Medienrecht, 721, for an assessment of the pros and cons of a formal settlement procedure.
118  For a detailed discussion of this point, see Spindler, above n 108, 925–928. 
119  Cf K-N  Peifer, ‘Der Referentenentwurf zum Urhebervertragsrecht’ (2016) Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 6, 8, and J Kreile and E Schley, ‘Reform der Reform – Wie viel vom 
Kölner und Münchner Entwurf steckt im Referentenentwurf zum Urhebervertragsrecht?’ (2015) 
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 837, 837, for a discussion of a proposed new sentence in 
§ 32(2) UrhG.
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However, once the work of an autonomous creator has attained the 
status of an important avant-garde production within the circle of 
independent artists and generates considerable monetary revenue on 
the art market because of this status, the author may have a particular 
interest in a remuneration rule that ensures a fair profit sharing ex post. 
If the work becomes successful on the art market to such an extent that 
the remuneration originally received appears disproportionally low, an 
ex post remuneration rule would ensure that the author can demand 
an adjustment of the contract in the light of changed circumstances.
Again, experiences with copyright legislation in Germany can serve 
as an example in this context. Prior to the introduction of the above-
described 2002 Act on Copyright Contract Law, the German Copyright 
Act already contained a safeguard against remuneration schemes that 
turn out to be disproportionate in the course of a work’s exploitation: 
the so-called ‘bestseller clause’ was regarded as an important addition 
to the general rule on imprévision in the German Civil Code. It softened 
the requirement that new circumstances justifying an adjustment 
of the remuneration had to be unforeseeable for contracting parties 
at the time of concluding the exploitation contract. The strict 
application of this requirement had rendered the general imprévision 
rule in the German Civil Code ineffective in many copyright cases.120 
Against this background, the traditional bestseller clause in the 
German copyright system was based on an alternative threshold for 
requesting an adjustment of the remuneration: a showing of ‘gross’ 
disproportionality. This condition was deemed to be fulfilled when 
the honorarium received by the author amounted to only one-third 
of what would have constituted a usual royalty revenue when taking 
into account the work’s success.121
In the 2002 Act on Copyright Contract Law, the German legislator 
replaced this bestseller clause with an even more elastic ‘fairness 
clause’. In §  32a(1) UrhG, it was stated explicitly that this new 
clause could be invoked regardless of whether the parties could have 
foreseen the disproportionality between remuneration and revenue 
when entering into the exploitation contract. The condition of 
120  For instance, see German Federal Court of Justice, ‘Horoskop-Kalender’ (1991), Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 901, 902; German Federal Court of Justice, ‘Comic-Übersetzungen’ 
(1998) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 497, 502.
121  See German Federal Court of Justice, ‘Horoskop-Kalender’ (1991), Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz 
und Urheberrecht, 903.
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‘gross’ disproportionality was attenuated by setting forth a threshold 
of ‘striking’ disproportionality instead. In the official materials 
accompanying the 2002 Act, the German legislator explained that this 
new requirement could be deemed to be met when the author had 
received an honorarium amounting to less than half of the income 
that could have been expected considering the work’s success.122 
In  literature, it is argued that even one-fifth should already be 
sufficient to assume a striking disproportionality.123 German courts, 
however, have not had sufficient opportunities to fix this new 
threshold requirement yet.124
As with the traditional bestseller clause, the new fairness clause covers 
all kinds of contracts awarding exploitation entitlements. Its scope 
of application ranges from transfers and exclusive licenses to non-
exclusive licenses and specific permissions of use, such as a permission 
to translate or adapt a work.125 Moreover, the new provision makes it 
clear that in the case of a license chain, the author can assert the right 
to ex post adjustment of the contractually agreed remuneration against 
every license holder (§  32a(2) UrhG). It is thus irrelevant whether 
a licensee was involved in the original honorarium negotiations and 
received the exploitation entitlement directly from the author.
122  See Deutscher Bundestag, 23 January 2002, ‘Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen 
Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden Künstlern – Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Rechtsausschusses’, Drucksache 14/8058, 19.
123  Cf the overview provided by Schulze in Th Dreier and G Schulze, UrhG – Kommentar (CH 
Beck, 3rd ed, 2008) 616.
124  Court decisions based on the new fairness clause are still scarce. See Schulze, above 
n 122, 617. As to the practical difficulties of court procedures seeking to clarify the fairness 
of the remuneration received by the authors under the new fairness clause, see N  Reber, 
‘Der “Fairnessparagraph”, §  32a UrhG’ (2010) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – 
Internationaler Teil 708, 709.
125  See Schulze, above n 122, 613.
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Arguably, ex post adjustment measures of this type are more effective 
than attempts to secure a fair remuneration ex ante – at a stage 
where a work’s exploitation has not yet started. Support for ex post 
remuneration mechanisms can also be found in international copyright 
law. The optional droit de suite recognised in article  14ter(1) of the 
Berne Convention grants the author and her heirs an interest in any 
sale of original works of art and original manuscripts subsequent to 
the work’s first transfer. As bestseller and fairness legislation seeking 
to ensure an additional income in case of disproportionality between 
initial remuneration and later revenues, this international provision 
aims to ensure that the author receives a share of profits accruing from 
a work’s successful exploitation at a later stage.
For lawmakers aiming at appropriate remuneration mechanisms for 
individual creators, the debate on fair remuneration also yields more 
general guidelines. In particular, exploitation contracts offering authors 
a revenue share seem more desirable than fixed one-time honoraria in 
‘buy out’ contracts. With a remuneration scheme ensuring a continuous 
royalty stream, the risk of disproportionality between remuneration 
and revenue can be reduced from the outset. As a legislative measure, 
it may thus be advisable to encourage remuneration in the form of 
royalty percentages and discourage agreements based on lump sum 
honoraria as the only form of remuneration.
A final aspect of the debate on a fair remuneration for the work of 
creators concerns the cross-financing of productions. When ex post 
measures are taken to adjust the remuneration in the case of works 
having huge market success, exploiters may warn of shrinking budgets 
for the financing of less successful works. The income from bestsellers, 
so runs the argument, is needed to compensate for the losses stemming 
from unsuccessful productions. If the creative industry must share 
profits accruing from bestsellers with the authors, the potential of 
bestseller productions for levelling out losses resulting from investment 
in commercially insecure productions is reduced. This may limit the 
willingness of the creative industry to invest in unorthodox works of 
unknown artists from the outset.
Revisiting Bourdieu’s analysis, a line can be drawn between this 
cross-financing argument and the ongoing fight between bourgeois 
and autonomous authors for predominance in the field of literary 
and artistic production. If it was true that the creative industry used 
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the income from successful mainstream productions to finance less 
promising autonomous productions, ex post adjustments of revenue 
streams leading to a higher income for bourgeois bestseller authors 
may have the effect of reducing the budget available for less secure art 
productions of autonomous authors. In other words: the potential of 
mainstream productions of bourgeois authors serving as a subsidy for 
l’art pour l’art productions of autonomous authors would be reduced.
In the absence of an economic analysis confirming this alleged 
interdependence of investment decisions in bourgeois and autonomous 
productions in the creative industry, however, it cannot readily be 
assumed that the alleged cross-financing of art productions is taking 
place, and that it would be frustrated by ex post adjustments of 
remuneration schemes for bestsellers. These ex post adjustments 
would only occur when a work’s market success has not already been 
factored into the equation at the time of concluding the exploitation 
contract. Once a creator is known as a bestseller author, however, she 
will have the bargaining power to negotiate an adequate remuneration 
in the initial exploitation contract. Hence, ex post adjustments only 
impact the calculations of the creative industry in case a work was not 
expected to have outstanding commercial success so that the creator 
had limited bargaining power. Even if the alleged practice of cross-
financing exists, it is thus unclear whether these cases would minimise 
industry profits to such an extent that the alleged subsidising of art 
productions becomes unfeasible.
4.3. Redistribution of copyright revenue
Copyright legislation that aims to strengthen the position of creators 
vis-à-vis exploiters by awarding a right to fair remuneration 
presupposes that the creative industry is willing to invest in 
a  creator’s work. Otherwise, the creator will have no opportunity 
to assert remuneration rights in the first place. The central problem 
of autonomous art, then, is its limited potential to generate profit. 
As independent artists do not strive for market success, refuse to align 
their works with the tastes of the masses and are unlikely to create 
bestsellers, the grant of a right to fair remuneration – ex ante or ex post 
– may fail to yield tangible results. If no exploiter can be found for 
a true work of art, the autonomous artist will simply have no chance 
WhAt IF We CoUlD ReIMAGINe CoPyRIGht?
64
of invoking her right to fair remuneration. Hence, the grant of a right 
to fair remuneration does not change the position of an autonomous 
artist for the better in these circumstances.
Therefore, it is necessary, as a last resort, to also consider the room 
in copyright law for a direct redistribution of copyright revenue in 
favour of autonomous artists. Is it possible to subsidise independent 
literature and art with income accruing from dependent, profit-
oriented productions? At the level of individual, commercially 
successful authors or industries, the introduction of a direct subsidy 
of autonomous art is hardly conceivable. Out of solidarity, financially 
successful creators or exploiters may be prepared to sponsor 
autonomous art projects on a case-by-case basis. However, a statutory 
obligation to systematically deposit a share of the revenues accruing 
from successful productions in a fund for less successful autonomous 
productions would most likely be seen as an act of expropriation.
The situation is different, however, at the level of collective copyright 
management. In the EU, the Amazon case about the payment and 
repartitioning of private copying levies in Austria showed that far-
reaching mechanisms for the use of collected funds for social and 
cultural purposes may already be in place. One of the prejudicial 
questions asked by the Austrian Supreme Court was whether 
a collecting society lost its right to the payment of fair compensation 
if, in relation to half of the funds received, the collecting society was 
required by law not to pay the levy income to the persons entitled to 
compensation but to distribute it to social and cultural institutions.126
Answering this question, the CJEU held the view that EU law did not 
contain an obligation to pay all the fair compensation collected on 
the basis of private copying legislation directly to rights owners in 
cash. By contrast, a member state was free to provide that part of the 
compensation for the damage caused by private copying be distributed 
in the form of indirect compensation through social and cultural 
institutions set up for the benefit of authors and performing artists.127 
The fact that the fair compensation had to be regarded as recompense 
for the harm suffered by holders of the exclusive right of reproduction 
by reason of the introduction of the private copying exception did 
126  Amazon v Austro-Mechana (CJEU, C-521/11, 11 July 2013) [15].
127  Ibid [49].
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not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of such an indirect 
payment mechanism through the intermediary of social and cultural 
institutions.128 In the light of the objectives underlying the Information 
Society Directive, the Court even stated that such a system of indirect 
distribution of collected funds was conducive to ensuring that 
European cultural creativity and production received the necessary 
resources. It also safeguarded the independence and dignity of artistic 
creators and performers.129 The Court made it a condition, however, 
that the social and cultural establishments involved actually benefit 
those entitled to fair compensation for private copying. Moreover, 
it was necessary that the detailed arrangements for the operation 
of  social and cultural institutions were not discriminatory. Benefits 
had to be granted to those persons entitled to fair compensation and 
the system had to be open to nationals and foreigners alike.130
At the level of collecting societies, there might thus be room to adopt 
measures to offer extra support for autonomous artists and independent 
art productions. If it is legitimate to use half of the funds of collecting 
societies for social and cultural purposes, it also seems possible to 
devote particular attention to the furtherance of independent literature 
and art when taking decisions on the distribution of this substantial 
share of the collected money. However, the decision of the CJEU in 
Amazon sheds light on two hurdles to be surmounted in this context.
Firstly, the Court made it clear that the use of funds by social and 
cultural institutions must constitute an indirect form of payment for 
those entitled to the collected remuneration. In the Amazon case, the 
remuneration was the result of private copying legislation providing 
for the payment of fair compensation for the damage caused by acts 
of private copying.131 Hence, the question arises to which extent the 
partitioning of collected funds must directly relate to the losses of 
128  Ibid [50].
129  Ibid [52].
130  Ibid [53]–[54].
131  Art 5(2)(b) ISD. As to the criterion of harm which the CJEU established in this context, see 
Padawan v SGAE, (CJEU, C-467/08, 21 October 2010) [40], [42]. As to the underlying debate on 
private copying in the EU, see DJG Visser, ‘Private Copying’ in PB Hugenholtz, AA Quaedvlieg 
and DJG Visser (eds), A Century of Dutch Copyright Law – Auteurswet 1912–2012 (deLex, 2012) 
413; JN Ullrich, ‘Clash of Copyrights – Optionale Schranke und zwingender finanzieller Ausgleich 
im Fall der Privatkopie nach Art 5 Abs. 2 lit. B) Richtlinie 2001/29/EG und Dreistufentest’ (2009) 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, 283; C Geiger, ‘The Answer 
to the Machine Should not be the Machine: Safeguarding the Private Copy Exception in the 
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individual groups of authors. If a strict alignment with individual 
damage is necessary, the requirement of an indirect compensation via 
social and cultural institutions would replicate the general problem of 
a focus on monetary incentives in copyright law. As profit-oriented 
mainstream productions are likely to be copied more often than 
independent avant-garde productions, it seems difficult to spend a 
higher share of the collected remuneration on programs supporting 
l’art pour l’art productions and artists. By contrast, the lion’s share 
of the collected remuneration would have to benefit those authors 
presumably suffering most from private copying: profit-oriented 
mainstream artists.
In Amazon, however, the CJEU referred to the fact that it was 
very difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the damage caused by 
private copying. Against this background, the Court underlined that 
member states enjoyed wide discretion in determining the form, the 
detailed arrangements and the possible level of fair compensation.132 
In the exercise of this wide discretion, member states were free to 
establish a  system of indirect compensation via social and cultural 
institutions.133 Hence, the Court itself does not seem to insist on 
a system that distributes collected money meticulously on the basis 
of the individual harm suffered by individual authors because 
such a detailed calculation of individual damage is hardly possible. 
The  Austrian provision underlying the Amazon decision read 
as follows:
1. Collecting societies may create institutions for social and cultural 
purposes for the beneficiaries which they represent and for their 
family members.
2. Collecting societies that exercise the right to remuneration for blank 
cassettes shall create institutions for social or cultural purposes and 
pay to them 50 per cent of the funds generated by that remuneration, 
minus the relevant administration costs …
3. Collecting societies must establish strict rules concerning the sums 
paid by their institutions for social and cultural purposes.
Digital Environment’ (2008) European Intellectual Property Review, 121; C Geiger, ‘Right to Copy 
v. Three-Step Test, The Future of the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment’ (2005) 
Computer Law Review International, 12.
132  Amazon v Austro-Mechana, (CJEU, C-521/11, 11 July 2013) [20], [40].
133  Ibid [49].
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4. As regards the funds paid to social and cultural institutions 
deriving from remuneration in respect of blank cassettes, the 
federal Chancellor may determine, by regulation, the circumstances 
to be taken into account by the rules to be established under 
subparagraph 3. That regulation must ensure, inter alia, that:
1. there is a fair balance between the sums allocated to social 
institutions and those allocated to cultural institutions;
2. in the case of social establishments, it is possible, primarily, 
to provide support for rightholders suffering hardship;
3. the sums allocated to cultural establishments are used to promote 
the interests of rightholders.134
In subsection 4(2), this provision explicitly leaves room to focus on 
‘rightholders suffering hardship’. Therefore, it seems that the indirect 
compensation mechanism following from the Austrian system is 
not strictly based on individual harm suffered by individual right 
holders. By contrast, particular support for creators in a precarious 
financial situation is possible. The criterion of harm underlying the 
remuneration system for private copying in the EU, therefore, does 
not constitute an insurmountable hurdle when seeking to set up 
social and cultural institutions with a particular focus on support for 
independent art and artists.
Secondly, the CJEU made it clear in Amazon that a system of 
indirect compensation via social and cultural institutions must not 
be discriminatory. This further requirement could also be seen as 
an obstacle to the establishment of a system favouring autonomous 
creators. Particular support for l’art pour l’art productions could be 
regarded as an unfair discrimination against bourgeois mainstream 
authors. This conclusion, however, need not be the last word on 
the matter. Cultural institutions can support autonomous art while 
basing their sponsoring decisions on objective criteria, such as a 
need to provide financial support because of missing opportunities 
to find a commercial investor. As autonomous art has lower chances 
of attracting the interest of commercial exploiters, the application 
of such a general criterion could de facto have the effect of offering 
134  §  13 of the Austrian Law on Collecting Societies (Verwertungsgesellschaftengesetz) of 
13 January 2006, Bundesgesetzblatt  I, 9/2006, as in force at the time of the Amazon case. The 
translation is taken from Amazon v Austro-Mechana, (CJEU, C-521/11, 11 July 2013), [8].
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stronger support for independent l’art pour l’art productions than 
for profit-oriented mainstream productions. Moreover, it must be 
considered that even if discrimination in favour of autonomous art 
was found, this discrimination could be justified. Given the above-
described fundamental importance of autonomous art as an engine 
of alternative visions of society that may pave the way for necessary 
social and political changes, there is a sound justification for lending 
stronger support to independent productions and autonomous artists.
Hence, the discussion of redistribution mechanisms in the field of 
collective management of copyright revenue, such as the Austrian 
system of indirect compensation for private copying via social and 
cultural institutions, shows that mechanisms for the partitioning of 
collected funds in line with specific social and cultural objectives are 
possible. To offer stronger support for autonomous art and artists, 
it would be necessary to employ these redistribution mechanisms 
systematically to support autonomous artists and finance the 
production of independent art capable of offering alternative visions 
of society.
5. Towards a copyright system supporting 
autonomous art
Bourdieu’s sociological analysis provides an important theoretical 
model that sheds light on the motivations and expectations of different 
groups of creators. It explains how the ongoing fight between bourgeois 
and autonomous creators for predominance in the field of literary and 
artistic production impacts the quality standards and the internal 
discourse in the art community, and how it influences the degree of 
autonomy of the social space in which works of literature and art are 
created. Bourdieu highlights the plurality of factors influencing the 
decision to create a work. With a spectrum of driving forces ranging 
from monetary to reputational rewards, the analysis confirms previous 
research pointing out that the focus on the motivating power of 
pecuniary incentives in copyright law is incomplete and doubtful. 
In the area of autonomous l’art pour l’art productions, Bourdieu 
identifies a peculiar reverse economy contradicting the reliance on 
the grant of exploitation rights as a reward and incentive scheme: 
a creator winning in economic terms loses in artistic terms. Artists 
69
2 . CoPyRIGht, CReAtoRS AND SoCIety’S NeeD FoR AUtoNoMoUS ARt
striving for monetary success are unlikely to acquire a reputation as 
an autonomous, independent artist in the art community. From this 
perspective, copyright law may even be accused of enticing authors 
away from an autonomous l’art pour l’art orientation. Considering 
Bourdieu’s description of the ongoing fight of bourgeois and 
autonomous creators for predominance in the field of literary and 
artistic production, it may also be said that copyright is not impartial 
in the power struggle. Focusing on monetary incentives, it offers more 
support for bourgeois authors than for autonomous authors.
As state subsidies for autonomous art and artists are continuously 
reduced, it is indispensable to remove this bias of copyright law in 
favour of profit-oriented mainstream productions. In the absence 
of public funds for the creation of independent literature and art, 
it would be disastrous not to take measures supporting autonomous 
productions in copyright law. Works of true art fulfil a function of 
particular importance in society. They offer alternative visions of life 
and society that can pave the way for necessary changes of social and 
political conditions. Without these impulses provided by independent, 
autonomous art, society has less chances to evolve and overcome 
imperfections. Hence, it is of particular importance to identify those 
features of copyright law that are capable of compensating for the loss 
of state subsidies and functioning as a driver of autonomous art.
The analysis of copyright law from this perspective leads to a broader 
understanding of authors’ rights. Apart from traditional exploitation 
rights that allow an author to prohibit the unauthorised use of literary 
and artistic works (right to control consumptive use), copyright law 
should also recognise an author’s right to use pre-existing material 
for the purpose of creating new works (right of transformative use of 
protected material). Limitations that are central to this transformative 
process, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the freedom to 
make quotations, parodies and remixes, would have to obtain the 
same status as traditional exploitation rights. This would exclude 
a strict, narrow interpretation. It would also require the development 
of appropriate enforcement mechanisms, for instance with regard 
to works protected through technological measures.
The analysis of copyright law in the light of Bourdieu’s theory also 
leads to the question how copyright law can ensure a fair remuneration 
for bourgeois and autonomous authors alike. It is contradictory when 
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the law justifies the grant of broad exploitation rights in the light 
of the difficult income situation of creators, while at the same time 
condoning the practice of imposing ‘buy out’ contracts upon authors 
with insufficient bargaining power. Again, Bourdieu’s analysis can offer 
guidelines in this regard. While a general right to fair remuneration 
ex ante may be of particular importance to bourgeois authors whose 
works are likely to be commercially successful in the marketplace, 
independent artists may have a particular interest in a remuneration 
rule that ensures a fair profit sharing ex post.
Accordingly, legislative measures seeking to ensure that creators receive 
a fair remuneration for their creative work should not be confined to 
mechanisms focusing on an appropriate reward ex ante – at the time 
the exploitation contract is concluded. By contrast, fair remuneration 
legislation must necessarily include an ex post remuneration rule 
giving authors the right to demand an adjustment of the exploitation 
contract if a work has outstanding success. If the paid honorarium 
appears disproportionately low in the light of a work’s later success, 
such an ex post rule ensures an appropriate remuneration against the 
background of verifiable sales and income figures. The introduction of 
an ex post remuneration mechanism may also encourage the conclusion 
of exploitation contracts which, instead of merely providing for a one-
time ‘buy out’ honorarium, offer continuous royalty payments based 
on a predefined revenue share.
Finally, the present analysis yields the insight that a direct 
redistribution of money in the creative sector is advisable to support 
autonomous art and artists. Such a redistribution of financial 
resources is possible in the area of collective copyright management. 
The schemes of collecting societies for the partitioning of collected 
funds can systematically be aligned with the need to support the 
production of independent art. For this purpose, the distribution of 
copyright revenue that is available for autonomous art should be left 
to designated bodies of collecting societies with a particular focus on 
furthering the production of autonomous literature and art.
As a critical comment on this latter point, it is to be added that the 
recommendation of a direct redistribution of copyright revenue via 
designated bodies of collecting societies is inspired by Bourdieu’s 
conclusion that, as a result of reduced state subsidies for independent 
art, the autonomy of the field of literary and artistic productions is 
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currently at risk. Against this background, the direct redistribution 
of remuneration in favour of autonomous art and artists must be seen 
as an extraordinary measure. It culminates in the cross-financing of 
independent art through income accruing from dependent mainstream 
productions. On its merits, this concept imposes an obligation on 
the cultural sector to finance its own autonomy. Given the crucial 
importance of autonomous art for society as a whole, however, this 
may be deemed an unfairly heavy burden. On the one hand, measures 
based on partitioning schemes of collecting societies that favour 
autonomous art must not become a cheap escape strategy for state 
authorities seeking to rid themselves of the responsibility to ensure 
an intact system of autonomous art and provide financial support 
for underlying societal goals. On the other hand, the implementation 
of support strategies for autonomous art by the cultural sector 
itself has the advantage of avoiding the shortcomings of direct state 
patronage.135 Funding via repartitioning schemes of collecting societies 
allows creators to establish criteria for the distribution of available 
funds themselves. The discussion about an appropriate framework 
for  supporting autonomous art may be a particularly challenging 
task for the different groups of artists who are members of a given 
collecting society. Once it is clear that a certain percentage of collected 
revenue must be available for autonomous art, however, the necessity 
to find workable solutions for the distribution of resulting funds is not 
unlikely to lead to the establishment of a procedure for appropriate 
decision-making. The funding decisions taken by the designated 
bodies of collecting societies, in turn, can be qualified as acts of 
self-regulation. Once this self-regulation is in place, the state can 
contribute to the funding of autonomous art without interfering with 
the decision-making process. For this purpose, the state can simply 
make additional funds available to the designated bodies of collecting 
societies (which have been established by the artists in the collecting 
society themselves).
135  For a detailed discussion of potential shortcomings, see SA  Pager, ‘Beyond Culture vs. 
Commerce: Decentralizing Cultural Protection to Promote Diversity Through Trade’ (2011) 31 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 63, 75–97. However, the shortcomings 
listed by Pager are not fully applicable in the present context because he focuses on market-
based incentives and commercial productions.
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Finally, the limitations of the present analysis must not be concealed. 
Bourdieu focuses on professional authors devoting time and effort 
to the creation of literary and artistic works. Hence, the rights and 
remuneration infrastructure that would be needed to support the 
creativity of amateur creators falls outside the scope of the present 
inquiry from the outset. Guidelines for the application of copyright 
rules to amateur producers of user-generated content can hardly be 
inferred from Bourdieu’s theoretical model. Therefore, the various 
questions136 raised by the increased participation of users in the 
creation of literary and artistic works remain open.
136  For an exceptional case of a specific use privilege for user-generated content, see Art 29.21 
of the Copyright Act of Canada, as introduced by Bill C-11, Copyright Modernization Act, adopted 
18 June 2012. As to the debate on user-generated content and its impact on copyright law, see 
SD  Jamar, ‘Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the 
Internet Social Networking Context’ (2010) 19 Widener Law Journal 843; N  Helberger et al, 
Legal Aspects of User Created Content (Institute for Information Law, 2009) available at <ssrn.
com/abstract=1499333>; MWS  Wong, ‘Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright 
Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?’ (2009) 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment 
and Technology Law 1075; E Lee, ‘Warming Up to User-Generated Content’ (2008) University of 
Illinois Law Review 1459; B Buckley, ‘SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement’ (2008) 31 
Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 235; TW Bell, ‘The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded 
Authors: How User-Generated Content Affects Copyright Policy’ (2008) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law 841; S Hechter, ‘User-Generated Content and the Future of 
Copyright: Part One – Investiture of Ownership’ (2008) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment 
and Technology Law 863; G Lastowka, ‘User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds’ (2008) 10 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 893.
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